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Abstract
Positing complex adaptive systems made of agents with relations between them that
can be composed, it follows that they can be described by gauge theories similar to
elementary particle theory and general relativity. By definition, a universal dynamics
is able to determine the time development of any such system without need for further
specification. The possibilities are limited, but one of them - reproduction fork dynamics
- describes DNA replication and is the basis of biological life on earth. It is a universal
copy machine and a renormalization group fixed point. A universal equation of motion in
continuous time is also presented.
DESY 94-184
October 1994
All known interactions between fundamental particles are described by gauge theories, as we
know, including Einsteins theory of gravity, general relativity. Here we argue that the scope of
gauge theory is much wider, including
• physical systems
• biological organisms
• Organizations of human society
• spiritual edifices: Minsky’s ”society of mind”[1], languages, evolutionary algorithms, etc.
Example: Gauge theory of swimming of micro-organisms [2].
Gauge theory can describe complex adaptive systems, i.e. anything alive in the widest
sense, especially autopoietic systems which ”make themselves” in an approximately autonomous
fashion [3]. All these systems consist of agents and their relations. Both evolve in time. Agents
organize themselves into larger structures as a consequence of the relations between them which
determine their interaction.
I will give the argument for gauge theory, present examples for various of its aspects, and
add remarks on important ramifications.
An expanded discussion of the contents of the first two sections is found in [4].
1 Structure: What is a thing?
The state of a system at time t may be considered as a category K. In this way structure can
be described.
∗Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and German Israel Foundation. Submitted for publication
1
Object: Arrow: ✲
s ✲✛  ✒
❅❘
❅■
 ✠
Figure 1: The structure of a brick wall determines a category
Agents become objects X of a category,
Relations become arrows f : X 7→ Y of a category
The basic postulates of mathematical category theory are
1. Identity arrows ιX : X 7→ X exist,
2. Arrows can be composed,
f : X 7→ Y, g : Y 7→ Z defines g ◦ f : X 7→ Z.
Composition is associative; ιY ◦ f = f = f ◦ ιX .
Example: brick wall. Its objects are the bricks and the fundamental arrows specify the
translation of a brick to the position of a nearest neighbour. These arrows specify the structure
of the wall. They can be composed to yield translations to other bricks’ positions.
Composability of relations is our central postulate. This postulate leads to gauge theory.
Examples: friend of a friend, husband of a sister = brother-in-law.
In a *-category a relation f of X to Y defines a possible relation f ∗ of Y to X (adjoint
arrow).
An arrow f is invertible if an arrow f−1 exists such that f ◦ f−1 = ιY , f
−1 ◦ f = ιX .
Functors F : K 7→ K ′ are maps of categories which preserve identity and composition law.
We call K ′ a representation of K if F is onto.
The following special features will be important.
Locality: Certain arrows are declared as fundamental, and called links , all others are
composed from them. Dynamics will be such that an agent can be influenced by another one
if they are related by a link. ιX is fundamental.
Emergence: Nonlocal phenomena should emerge from local relations as in physics.
Example: Cognition. The salient features of a picture (long smooth curves) can be detected
by local interaction among low level cortical neurons which represent neighbouring picture
elements [5].
From links bi : Xi−1 7→ Xi one composes
Paths: bn ◦ ... ◦ b2 ◦ b1 = C : X0 7→ Xn .
K is connected if there exists a path connecting X to Y for every pair (X, Y ). Closed paths
are called loops .
Example: Lattice Gauge Theory [6] furnishes a discretized version of the gauge theory of
elementary particles. The objects are indexed by sites x of a lattice. They specify matter
fields Ψ(x) ∈ Ωx, where Ωx are vector spaces of some dimension n. The fundamental relations
are parallel transporters U [b] : Ωx 7→ Ωy along links b = (y, x) of a lattice. They are unitary
linear maps, possibly respecting additional invariant structure such as antisymmetric products
v1 ∧ ... ∧ vn.
Representation theorem: Every finite category admits a faithful representation as a
communication network as follows: There are spaces ΩX associated with objects X and arrows
act as maps f : ΩX 7→ ΩY , with ιX = id.
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The construction of the space ΩX uses the sets of all arrows to and from X . Details are
given in Appendix A. We talk of one time. The maps f represent channels, not acts, of
communication. Time development is considered later.
The maps f need not be linear. Apart from this, the setup is as in lattice gauge theory. The
lattice may be irregular, but irregular lattices were considered before, and standard constructs
such as covariant Laplacians carry over to this case. Nonlinearity introduces features of neural
nets [7]. There is a fundamental difference to neural net theory and to any cybernetic approach,
though. Because of the gauge principle it is in general not appropriate to characterize an object
at some time t by what is true about it.
The representation is not unique. Select for every X an invertible loop gX and substitute gY ◦
f◦g−1X for f : X 7→ Y . This produces another, equivalent representation. These transformations
are called gauge transformations . They will be considered in the next section.
Remark: According to Heidegger [8], the question ”what is a thing?” ”is an old one. Always
new about it is only that it must be asked again and again.” I did not answer it; I merely
expained how to describe a thing. The description is in the sprit of Wittgenstein’s isomorphism
theory [12] (see Appendix C). In the last section of this paper, the question will be tied to
the problem of how to choose block spins in renormalization group theory [13], and to a basic
feature (autonomy) of Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoietic systems [3].
2 Gauge theory
We generalize the basic notions of gauge theory to the general setup.
Curvature = Field Strength = Frustration
exists unless there is at most one arrow f from X to Y for every X, Y . States in different
ΩX cannot be compared (without parallel transport which depends on the path ) if there is
frustration. Without frustration, all paths from a given object X0 to a given Xn define the
same arrow..
Example: Gossip results from frustrated communication. When it returns from a loop, the
story is no longer the same. Human communication is not necessarily rational, i.e. limited to
exchange of information in terms which have the same meaning to everybody. Poetry, political
propaganda and all kinds of seduction exploit this. Gauge theory avoids a priori rationality
posits.
Invariants: F (ξ1, ...ξn), ξi ∈ ΩX is an invariant if F (Cξ1, ...Cξn) is independent of the
path C : X 7→ Y for every Y . It follows that F (Cξ1, ..., Cξn) = F (ξ1, ..., ξn) for all loops C,
since C = ιX is one of them.
Invariant functions of loops s : ΩX 7→ ΩX are similarly defined. More generally, invariants
of K can be defined as functors F from the network K or from categories derived from K to
unfrustrated categories ; for details see [4].
Remark: The totality of such functors we may call meaning of K, and the image of objects,
concepts. Kant, in contradistinction, proposed to transcend from concepts to objects in his
critique of pure reason [8]. It is of interest to consider extended categories which include
besides K also concepts and their relations. Besides images of relations in K there are relations
from objects to concepts through the functors F , and there may be additional relations between
concepts from intertwiners between different F ’s. One may ask how such extended categories
can grow from K dynamically. (The intertwining relation reads like this. T12 : Ω
1
F1(X)
7→ Ω2
F2(X)
is defined, but possibly zero, for every pair of concepts Fi(X) which are related to the same
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object X . If f : X 7→ Y is an arrow then TF1(f) = F2(f)T . In group theory such intertwiners
are made of Clebsch Gordan coefficients.)
Example: Money [9]. Money in a money-based economy is a prototypical example of an
invariant, and it serves to give an invariant meaning to certain transfers in society, viz. acqui-
sition by purchase. According to Luhmann [9], p.69, ”the medium [money] assures that in the
realm of economy, actions have approximately the same meaning for him who acts as for the
observer.”
Consensus on the meaning of invariants can be achieved among all agents Y by synchro-
nization = path independent parallel transport to Y.
Example: In general relativity, and more generally in any curved (pseudo) Riemannian
manifold M there is no global notion of parallelism of tangent vectors ξ ∈ TM , i.e. no
consensus on the meaning of the direction of a vector is possible. But the length of a vector is
an invariant.
Gauge group G={GX}={ holonomy groups}
GX contains all invertible arrows f : X 7→ X (loops). These gauge transformations map
ΩX into ΩX and f : ΩX 7→ ΩY into gY ◦ f ◦ g
−1
X . So they are invertible maps of objects
and relations. They are isomorphisms of representations of the same category K and leave
invariants unchanged. The invariants are the observables in lattice gauge theory.
We could instead define a gauge group G′ ⊃ G as the group of all those invertible trans-
formatons of the spaces ΩX which leave all invariants invariant. The holonomy group has the
advantage that it is intrinsic to the category.
Remark: For human minds we call the totality of fundamental loops consciousness . They
make the agent aware of himself (because they transform output into input), and they can serve
as a short time memory (because dynamics will be such that a fundamental arrow propagates
a signal in one time step). These features characterize consciousness according to Crick and
Koch. The totality of all loops is related to perception.
Composite objects with internal structure: Categories can be objects of new categories.
Conversely, a connected unfrustrated subcategory KO ⊂ K may be reinterpreted as a single
new composite object. This defines a new category K ′ which is a representation of K. The
required new composition laws are of the form g ◦ f (in K ′) = g ◦ C ◦ f (in K) , C a path in
KO.
Example: Gauge covariant block spins in lattice gauge theory [14].
3 Gauge transformations in linguistics
were described by Quine before the gauge theory of elementary particles was found [11]. He
says
”the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker’s language can be so permuted or
mapped onto itself that
(a) the totality of speakers disposition to verbal behavior remains invariant, and yet
(b) the mapping is no mere correlation of sentences with equivalent sentences, in any plausi-
ble sense of equivalence however loose. Sentences without numbers can diverge drastically from
their respective correlates yet the divergences can systematically so offset one another that the
overall pattern of associations of sentences with one another and with non-verbal stimulation is
preserved”.
The disposition to verbal behavior in the presence of a nonverbal stimulus is the linguists
observable. Observables are invariant. The pattern of associations is preserved - i.e. the map
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Figure 2: Reproduction fork dynamics
is an isomorphism.
About the role of language, Quine has this to say: ”This structure of interconnected sen-
tences is a single connected fabric including all sciences and indeed everything we ever say about
the world”. Thus, if gauge transformations are here, they are everywhere.
Quine’s connected fabric is interpreted as a category. The agents are sentences of the
language, and the relations are interconnections or associations between them. In the spirit of
Wittgenstein [12] we may regard sentences as translations (functorial images) of the world - or
at least an attempt at that.
Translations need not exist. Quine hints at that by giving an example. A tentative english
translation ”all rabbits are men reincarnate” of a native sentence would violate the rules, be-
cause a native would assent (it is imagined) in the presence of any nonverbal stimulus whatever,
while an Englishman would not.
Next we turn to time development t 7→ Kt. Sorin Solomon proposed to call it ”drama”.
4 Universal Dynamics
is local dynamics which is defined for every category. A state should contain all necessary
information about its time development in itself, without need for further extrinsic specification.
Gauge invariance is an automatic consequence.
If such a dynamics operates at any level, it will also operate at more composite levels if it
has renormalization group fix point properties. An example will be shown.
We consider first dynamics in discrete time. The following moves are defined for every (local
*-) category
1. death of an object or arrow,
2. replication of an object or arrow,
3. fusion of indistinguishable arrows, or objects (inverse of 2),
4. restitution of a missing adjoint arrow in a *-category,
5. declaration as fundamental of a composite arrow.
It is easy to describe the new categories also in formulas, but I omit them.
Dynamics fixes which moves take place next, given the present state (1st order dynamics)
or the state and the moves in the previous time interval (2nd order dynamics).
There are two types of replication of an object:
2a) with replication of arrows
2b) dividing arrows among duplicates.
Example 1: Reproduction fork dynamics is a version of 2b combined with 4. It is first order.
The forks are made of arrows without adjoints. They designate the objects next to be split,
see figure 2. The arrows are divided like this: ingoing to one copy, outgoing to the other, the
other way round for arrows in forks. The dotted arrows are optional. This kind of dynamics is
the basis of biological life on earth. It governs DNA replication during cell division [15]. It is
a universal copy machine not only for linear chains or helices, but for any structure with any
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Figure 3: Move 5 interpreted as motion
number of incident arrows on each object and with substructures of any scale. Therefore it is a
renormalization group fix point [13]. Take any connected *-category without missing adjoints.
Make a single object replicate. This creates forks which travel until the whole category has
been duplicated, including any substructure. The dynamics is the same on all scales.
Moreover, the fix point dynamics is insensitive to small perturbations. Rare random death
of arrows or objects will in general not jeopardize ability to replicate. Excessive death of arrows
leads to random forks, though, and too many of them can result in cancerous growth.
A universal copy machine is an optimal prerequisite for evolution. Programming just a
few sterilizations and refertilizations of objects, elaborate structures can be grown, for instance
hypercubic lattices with periodic boundary conditions, multigrids etc.. A C++-class library
was written to implement this [18]. Deviant first replication steps can in some cases induce
formation of double sheeted covers in place of two copies.
Material properties - embedding of material particles in space - did not enter here. An
encyme - topiomerase type II - is known to exist which relieves DNA from the most serious
burden of its material existence. It enables strings of DNA to pass through each other [15]. It
is thought to operate by cutting one of the strings, holding on to the ends while passing them
beyond the other string, and then rejoining them.
Remark 1: It might be objected that this categorical introduction of replication begs the
question of how the replication of anything works in the first place. Autocatalytic replication
of real molecules is known [16] and there are simple models. Suppose the potential energy
of unbound ”molecule” a in the field of unbound b has a minimum at binding energy E and
a high maximum at activation energy A, while bound or unbound molecules in the field of
bound ones have binding energy E/2 and no activation energy. If any X = ab is present
initially, it replicates in an environment where a and b abound, ab+ a+ b 7→ abab 7→ ab+ ab ;
E 7→ 3E/2 7→ 2E.
Remark2: Deterministic replication starting from a single object will yield indistinguishable
clones inside clones. Stochasticity will alter that, leading to ”identity breaking” in two stages:
from strong identity, where an object is identical only to itself, to indistinguishability, and
from there to distinguishability. Regarding strong identity as strongest order, each step would
decrease the order.
Move 5) is the prototype of motion.
Example2: Quantum mechanical motion of particles in space can be described by a universal
dynamics. We may picture a category of objects (”space points”) linked by bidirectional arrows
plus additional objects (”point particles”) linked to the former by one unidirectional arrow each.
The Schro¨dinger equation for the complex amplitude of a category K reads
iΨ˙(K) = −∆Ψ(K) ≡ −
∑
µ
[Ψ(µK)−Ψ(K)] .
Summation is over moves µ of individual particles as in figure 3. For a single particle of mass m
on a cubic lattice of space points, this is the standard discretization of the Schro¨dinger equation
for free motion. Units of time h¯/2m are set to 1. The ”used up” dashed arrow is immediately
restituted
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Example3: Universal equation of motion in continuous time. Consider fundamental arrows
f : ΩX 7→ ΩY , including fundamental loops regarded as attributes of objects. Assume spaces ΩX
possess tangent spaces TΩX and maps f are invertible and have derivatives f
′ : TΩX 7→ TΩY .
Demand
d
dt
(f˙ ◦ f−1) = βf˙ ′ ◦
∑
g=g1◦g2:X 7→Y
{
(f−1′ ◦ (g˙ ◦ g−1)− (g−1′ ◦ g˙) ◦ f−1
}
(1)
This is meaningful, i.e. generally covariant (see Appendix B). It is remarkable that a meaningful
equation exists at all.
Summations are over pairs (g1, g2) of fundamental arrows so that g is defined. β ∈ R could
depend on whether f is a loop or not.
The equation is quadratic in velocities like Einsteins equation for the motion of a massive
particle in a gravitational field, x¨µ = −Γµνρ(x)x˙
ν x˙ρ . It retains its form when f−1 is substituted
for f , and induces similar equations for composite arrows. In this sense it scales.
Note that the expression in {} is only nonzero if there is nonvanishing frustration, i.e. path
dependence, in a generalized sense as appropriate for initial states {K, K˙}.
5 Dynamics of composite objects
should be determined by a renormalization group transformation with dynamically determined
coarse grained variables=blockspins [13].
Grabowski showed recently how to determine blockspins dynamically from locality demands
on effective actions in quantum field theory [17]. The locality demand amounts to making the
composite objects as autonomous as possible.
The limits of resolution of observations will enter into the specification of the block spins
(they fix the scale): What is a (composite) thing is in the eye of the observer. Our mind
organizes the world into things which are stable and capable of an approximately autonomous
existence.
At composite levels, unfrustrated communication - i.e. communication by exchange of
invariants - may tend to dominate, because of destructive interference effects for others.
Remark: This can be seen from random walk expansions.
According to Luhmann [9], a system determines its own medium of [unfrustrated] communi-
cation. ”The most important effect of the medium money at the level of the whole society arises
from the fact that the payment acquieses third parties. Although they are themselves interested
in scarce goods (or could be interested in the future) they are able to look on [peacefully] while
somebody takes posession of scarce goods, because he pays for them.” Basically, the intrinsi-
cally frustrated character of human perception is partially overcome by assignment of invariant
meaning.
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Appendix A: Proof of the main representation theorem
A slightly more elaborate version of the representation theorem was proven by the author in [4].
For the convenience of the reader, the statement and proof of this theorem is reproduced here,
and it is shown how the present version, which is closer to lattice gauge theory, is obtained as
a corollary.
We use a slightly more elaborate notation than in the main text. Given the category K with
objects X, Y, ..., we denote by Mor(Y,X) the set of arrows f : X 7→ Y and g ◦
Y
f : X 7→ Z for
the composite of f ∈ Mor(Y,X) with g ∈Mor(Z, Y ).
Representation theorem 1 (Representation of a category as a communication network) Ev-
ery category K permits a faithful representation with the following properties
To every object X there exists an input space AX and an output space ΩX . The input space
contains a distinuished element ∅ (”empty input”). Arrows f ∈ Mor(Y,X), g ∈ Mor(Z, Y )
and objects X act as maps
X : AX 7→ ΩX , (2)
ιX : ΩX 7→ AX (3)
f : ΩX 7→ AY (4)
with the properties
XιX = id : ΩX 7→ ΩX , ιXX = id : AX 7→ AX , (5)
g ◦
Y
f = gY f : ΩX 7→ AZ . (6)
It should be noted that ιX does not act as the identity map in general in this context.
Given this version of the representation theorem, we restrict attention to the output spaces
ΩX and to maps fˆ = Y ◦ f : ΩX 7→ ΩY . Renaming fˆ into f we obtain the representation
theorem of the main text.
Remark: In some applications, the distinguished empty input is mapped into a distinguished
output which is distinct from all other output. In this case it may be ignored. This happens
in pure gauge theory without matter fields. In other cases, X∅ = ΨX ∈ ΩX is dynamically
determined. Matter fields Ψx in lattice gauge theory are an example.
Proof of the representation theorem 1 for categories
Given a category K, we write Mor(Y, ∗) for the set of all its arrows to Y etc.. We define
In(Y ) =Mor(Y, ∗) , Out(Y ) =Mor(∗, Y ) .
We write X = α(f) if f ∈ Mor(Y,X) ⊂ In(Y ), and correpondingly Z = ω(f) if f ∈
Mor(Z, Y ) ⊂ Out(Y ). The output space will be defined as a subspace ΩY of Ω
virt
Y . Ω
virt
Y
consists of maps
ζ : OutY 7→ Mor(∗, ∗)
with the property ζ(f) ∈MorK(ω(f), ∗).
An object Y will act as a map
Y : In(Y ) 7→ ΩY .
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according to
Y f(g) = g ◦
Y
f (g ∈ Out(Y )).
The output space is defined as the image of Y , and the input space as space of equivalence
classes (if necessary) of elements of InK(Y ), which Y maps into the same ζ ∈ Ω
virt
Y .
ΩY = IM Y ⊂ Ω
virt
Y , (7)
AY = In(Y )/KER Y . (8)
Y is invertible as a map from AY to ΩY . Its inverse is ιY . The empty input ∅ ∈ AY is defined
as the equivalence class of ιY ∈Mor(Y, Y ) ⊂ In(Y ).
An arrow f ∈Mor(Y,X) is defined as a map ΩX 7→ AY by use use of the map ιX : ΩY 7→ AY ,
as follows.
f = fˆ ◦
X
ιX , (9)
fˆ(g) = f ◦
X
g for g ∈Mor(X, ∗) . (10)
The last formula defines fˆ as a map from In(X) to In(Y ). This map passes to equivalence
classes (8) thereby defining a map AX 7→ AY , The composition rule (6) holds.
Appendix B: Covariance of the universal equation of mo-
tion
To show that the equation of motion (1) has a coordinate independent meaning, we exhibit
both sides as elements of a space which has a coordinate independent meaning.
Let EX = TΩX the tangent space of ΩX . It is a fibre bundle over ΩX with projector piX .
Then f˙ : ΩX 7→ TΩY with piY ◦ f˙ = f.
The tangent space TEX = TTΩX is a fibre bundle over EX with projector piTX . Like the
tangent space of every bundle it has a vertical subspace V EX which is naturally isomorphic to
a factor space V EX ≃ TEX/pi
∗
XTΩX where pi
∗
X : TΩX 7→ TEX is the pullback of piX .
The map f induces a map of curves on ΩX into curves on ΩY and thereby a map f
′, called
its derivative,
f ′ : TOX 7→ TΩY obeying piY ◦ f
′ = f ◦ piX .
Similarly, f˙ maps curves in ΩX into curves in EY . Its time derivative f¨ is therefore a map from
ΩX to TEX which obeys piTY f¨ = f˙ . This map passes to the quotient, also denoted by f¨ .Since
piTY also passes to the quotient, h = f¨ is a map
h : ΩX 7→ V EY obeying piTY ◦ h = f˙ . (11)
R-linear combinations of such maps are defined and share the same property.
The derivative f˙ ′ of f˙ is naturally defined as a map from ΩX to TEY . It passes to the
quotient, also denoted by f˙ ′, viz.
f˙ ′ : ΩX 7→ V EY obeying piTY ◦ f˙
′ = f˙ ◦ pi.
Using these identities one verifies that the equation of motion is consistent with eq.(11) for
h = f¨ and is therefore meaningful.
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In holonomic coordinates {ηα, η˙α} on EY ,
f¨(t, ξ) =
∂2
∂t2
fα(t, ξ)
∂
∂η˙α
∈ V EY .
There is no term proportional to ∂
∂ηα
here because pi∗Y TΩY consists of such terms.
Remark: In the notation used here, the chain rule reads d
dt
g ◦ f = g˙ ◦ f + g′ ◦ f˙ .
Appendix C: Wittgensteins isomorphy theory [12]
Wittgensteins propositions are numbered, therefore every reader may find them in his own
edition of the tractatus in his own language. I give a selection of those propositions which are
particularly relevant here, in german.
Comment 1: The english translation is problematic; it hides something that I wish to
emphasize. (This only goes to confirm that translations to other languages may not exist)
Wittgenstein defines Sachverhalt as a ”link (Verbindung) between objects (entities, things)” in
proposition 2.01. Verbindung comes from binding. This crucial connection is suppressed by
the english translation of Verbindung as ”combination” instead of link or bond. Sachverhalt is
translated as ”atomic fact”. This is an interpretation due to B. Russell which is motivated by
what is said later in the text. In the same spirit, I propose to compose general arrows from
fundamental ones, called links.
Comment 2: Wittgensteins remark 5.5303 on identity is superseded by quantum mechanics.
In his introduction to [12], Russell states (p.16/17) [One has] ”sought to find such a property
[which must belong to every thing by a logical necessity] in self identity ... [but] accidental
characteristics of the world must, of course, not be admitted into the structure of logic. Mr.
Wittgenstein accordingly banishes identity ...”. Particles which are identical in the sense of in-
distinguishable are very important in quantum mechanics, and quantum fluctuations introduce
the accidental into the result of measurements.
The issue is important in the general context of this paper. Replication of objects, composite
or whatever, produces only indistinguishable copies. Variability comes only from stochasticity.
Mutations such as random death of a component can make formerly indistinguishable composite
objects distinguishable. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions (chaos) can magnify small
random fluctuations. But how do small fluctuations arise in the first place? From quantum
fluctuations. According to the views expressed in this article, things are in the eye of the
observer. The mental organization of the world into things requires an act of observation. This
link to observation brings in quantum fluctuations, because results of observations on systems
in the same quantum state can fluctuate.
Wittgensteins propositions
1. Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.
1.1 Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.
2. Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegensta¨nden (Sachen, Dingen).
2.0121 ... so ko¨nnen wir uns keinen Gegenstand ausserhalb der Mo¨glichkeit seiner
Verbindung mit andern denken.
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2.013 Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raum mo¨glicher Sachverhalte. Diesen Raum
kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding ohne den Raum.
2.021 Jede Aussage u¨ber Komplexe la¨sst sich in eine Aussage u¨ber deren Bestandteile
und in diejenigen Sa¨tze zerlegen, welche die Komplexe vollsta¨ndig beschreiben.
2.024 Die Substanz ist das, was unabha¨ngig von dem, was der Fall ist, besteht.
2.032 Die Art und Weise, wie die Gegensta¨nde in Sachverhalten zusammenha¨ngen, ist
die Struktur der Sachverhalte.
2.033 Die Form ist die Mo¨glichkeit der Struktur.
2.1 Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.
2.12 Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.
2.14 Das Bild besteht darin, daß sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise
zueinander verhalten.
2.15 Daß sich die Elemente des Bildes in bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander ver-
halten stellt vor, daß sich die Sachen so zueinander verhalten.
Dieser Zusammenhang der Elemente des Bildes heiße seine Struktur, und ihre
Mo¨glichkeit seine Form der Abbildung.
2.1513 Nach dieser Auffassung geho¨rt also zum Bilde auch noch die abbildende
Beziehung, die es zum Bild macht.
3. Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke
3.1 Im Satz dru¨ckt sich der Gedanke sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus.
3.12 Das Zeichen, durch welches wir den Gedanken ausdru¨cken, nenne ich das Satzze-
ichen. Und der Satz ist das Satzzeichen in seiner projektiven Beziehung zur
Welt.
3.13 Zum Satz geho¨rt alles, was zur Projektion geho¨rt; aber nicht das Projezierte ...
3.14 Das Satzzeichen besteht darin, daß sich seine Elemente, die Wo¨rter, in ihm auf
bestimmte Art und Weise zueinander verhalten.
3.144 ..
(Namen gleichen Punkten, Sa¨tze Pfeilen ...)
4. Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.
4.001 Die Gesamtheit der Sa¨tze ist die Sprache.
4.01 Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.
Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken.
4.1 Der Satz stellt das Bestehen oder Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten dar.
4.21 Der einfachste Satz, der Elementarsatz, behauptet das Bestehen eines Sachver-
halts.
5. Der Satz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion des Elementarsatzes.
5.526 Man kann die Welt vollsta¨ndig durch vollkommen verallgemeinerte Sa¨tze beschreiben,
das heißt also, ohne einen bestimmten Namen von vornherein einem bestimmten
Gegenstand zuzuordnen.
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Um dann auf die gewo¨hnliche Ausdrucksweise zu kommen, muß man einfach
nach dem Ausdruck ”es gibt ein und nur ein x, welches ...” sagen: Und dies x
ist a.
5.5303 Beila¨ufig gesprochen: Von zwei Dingen zu sagen, sie seien identisch, ist ein
Unsinn, und von einem zu sagen, es sei identisch mit sich selbst, sagt gar nichts.
6.3432 Wir du¨rfen nicht vergessen, daß die Weltbeschreibung durch die Mechanik immer
die ganz allgemeine ist. Es ist in ihr z.B. nie von einem bestimmten materiellen
Punkte die Rede, sondern immer nur von irgendwelchen.
6.361 In der Ausdrucksweise Hertz’s ko¨nnte man sagen: Nur gesetzma¨ßige Zusam-
menha¨nge sind denkbar.
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